activity of interpreting given data. Experimental data cannot provide a hook to mindindependent reality because laboratory manipulations and measurements are paradigmdependent. Moreover, different paradigms display different conceptual resources that make possible for scientists (before and after a scientific revolution) to see the world differently.
Kuhn contended for example that Aristotelians saw a falling stone as "a change of state rather than a process (…) the relevant measures of motion were therefore total distance covered and total time elapsed, parameters which yield what we should now call not speed but average speed. Similarly, because the stone was impelled by its nature to reach its final resting point, Aristotle saw the relevant distance parameter at any instant during the motion as the distance to the final end point rather than as that from the origin of motion". 3 Kuhn argued then that it is the conceptual switch from motion as distance to a final end point, to motion as distance from the origin that "underlies and gives sense to most of his [Galileo] well-known 'laws of motion'" (ibid.). This conceptual switch was in turn made possible by "the impetus paradigm" and the Scholastic doctrine of the latitude of forms. 4 According to the impetus theory, a stone gains increasing impetus as it recedes from its starting point, and hence starting point (rather than end point) became the relevant parameter in assessing the motion of falling stones. Similarly, Aristotle's notion of speed changed over the Medieval period to include both what we now call 'average speed' and what became later known as 'instantaneous speed'. Hence Kuhn's conclusion:
But when seen through the paradigm of which these conceptions were a part, the falling stone, like the pendulum, exhibited its governing laws almost on inspection.
(…) [Galileo] had developed his theorem on this subject together with many of its consequences before he experimented with an inclined plane. That theorem was another one of the network of new regularities accessible to genius in the world determined jointly by nature and by the paradigms upon which Galileo and his contemporaries had been raised. The other example Kuhn mentioned in relation to the claim of "working in a new world", is the passage from affinity theory to Dalton's atomic theory, whereby the gas mixtures were reinterpreted in terms of specific combinations of whole-number ratios of atomic elements. Kuhn claimed that Dalton successfully operated the conceptual switch from mixtures to compounds because as a meteorologist, he thought that the absorption of gases by water remained a mystery that affinity theory could not explain, and as such he was immune from the chemical paradigm of his time. There seems to be two key moments in Galileo's discovery of the law of free fall. 
Two notions of mind-dependence
In what follows, I want to take some preliminary steps towards distinguishing two main notions of mind-dependence, which seem to be intertwined in Kuhn's 'working in a new world' claim. These two notions are by no means the only two possible ones (for a third epistemic notion of mind-dependence may also be lurking in the background), but for the purpose of this paper, I am going to confine my attention to these two varieties 'planet' so that it could continue to make useful distinctions in a world where all celestial bodies, not just the sun, were seen differently from the way they had been seen before".
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In the rest of this paper I want to substantiate two main points. First, that Kuhn's view falls squarely within a semantic account of mind-dependence; and, second, that semantic mind-dependence does not entail ontic mind-dependence, pace any constructivist reading of Kuhn.
Incommensurability as untranslatability between scientific lexicons
21 Kuhn (1962), pp. 128-9. the semantic reading is already evident in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, it becomes prominent in the late Kuhn where the notion of incommensurability got redefined as a form of untranslatability between scientific lexicons. Applied to the conceptual vocabulary of a scientific theory, the term 'incommensurability' came to mean 'no common measure' intended as 'no common language'. Incommensurability amounted to the claim that there is no language into which both theories, conceived as sets of sentences, can be translated without residue or loss. 22 Untranslatable lexicons still imply that scientists before and after a revolution work in a new world.
Kuhn defined a scientific lexicon as the conceptual vocabulary of a scientific theory, consisting of 'kind terms', subject to what Kuhn calls the no-overlap principle:
no two kind terms, no two terms with the kind label, may overlap in their referents unless they are related as species to genus. There are no dogs that are also cats, no gold rings that are also silver rings, and so on: that's what makes dogs, cats, silver, and gold each a kind. 23 Kuhn associated kind terms with nomic and normic generalizations, where the former are laws of nature, the latter are generalizations amenable to exceptions. The same no-overlap principle that bars practitioners of a lexicon from importing kind terms into another lexicon, bars them also from importing some of the laws associated with kind terms into a new lexicon. 24 Indeed, in Kuhn's view, the main terms of any scientific theory are acquired together with the main laws of the theory. In Newtonian mechanics, the terms 'force', 'mass', and 'acceleration' are interdefined and acquired together with Newton's second law as a law-sketch that must be rewritten in different symbolic forms depending on the specific problems it is applied to (from the free fall, to the pendulum, to coupled harmonic oscillators). Physics students learn that in the Newtonian lexicon free fall is an example of 'forced' motion (instead of 'force-free' motion as it was for Aristotelians). As such, it is subject to a suitable symbolic expression of Newton's second law. These are the nomic expectations that the term 'free fall' brings along with it as a projectible term, and that make the term not translatable into the language of any physical theory where Newton's version of the second law does not apply. Thus, as Kuhn repeatedly stressed, 22 Kuhn (1983) . Reprinted in Kuhn (2000) , p. 36. 23 Kuhn (1991) . Reprinted in Kuhn (2000) In the above definition, by 'kind' k I mean the semantic kind picked out by the relevant kind terms, or if you like, the <kind concept> associated with the relevant kind terms-I do not mean 'kind' in a metaphysical sense of natural kinds carving nature at its joints.
Whenever the old taxonomic kind k 1 captured by t 1 (say, Aristotle's <free fall>) cannot become a sub-kind of a new kind k 2 captured by t 2 (say, Galileo's <free fall>), because a fundamental change has occurred in this taxonomic category in the meantime (from force-free to forced motion, for example), then the two terms are untranslatable, according to Kuhn's no-overlap principle. This change in the taxonomic category results, in turn, into a change in the classes of objects picked out by the kind term 'free fall' in the Aristotelian and Galilean lexicon, respectively (say, the upward motion of fire was classified as a force-free accelerated motion as much as the downward motion of stones in the Aristotelian lexicon, but not in the Galilean one). So the two classes of objects become non-overlapping.
What theory of reference is at work in Kuhn's semantic mind-dependence 2 ?
Kuhn never endorsed Putnam-Kripke causal theory of reference, as he made it clear in his response to Hacking precisely on this topic. 28 Kuhn argued that in the case of polysemous terms such as 'water', any attempt to resolve the tension by introducing two terms, 'water 1 ' and 'water 2 ', to designate two different meanings (water before and after isotopes) sharing nonetheless the same referents, 'is (…) linguistically unsupportable'.
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Epistemically, <water 1 > and <water 2 > are very different kind concepts, associated with different projectible expectations.
Kuhn then seemed to suggest that any attempt to bypass the 'working in a new world' problem by explaining how the reference of our kind terms is causally fixed (so that despite meaning-change, our kind terms are still referring to the same objects before be construed as individuals? I need a notion of 'kinds', including social kinds that will populate the world as well as divide up a pre-existing population. That need in turn introduces a last significant difference between me and Ian. He hopes to eliminate all residues of a theory of meaning from my position; I do not believe that that can be done. (…) Both 'water1' and 'water2' [before and after isotopes, MM] are kind terms: the expectations they embody are therefore projectible. Some of those expectations are different, however, which results in difficulties in the region where they both apply". Kuhn (1993), pp. 315-9 . In other words, for Kuhn it is not the case that a natural kind term such as 'water' refers to the same stuff named in an original causal baptism, irrespective of the conceptual changes that the term may have undergone to in the meantime. 29 Ibid., p. 318.
In other words, (X.) captures Kuhn's conclusion that given any two non-overlapping (i.e.
non species-to-genus) classes of objects, 30 there must be two distinct (non-overlapping) kind concepts picking them out. The distinct, non-overlapping kind concepts are the result of scientific revolution and paradigm shifts. Ultimately, we work in different worlds because our kind concepts have changed during a scientific revolution.
The argument from the no-overlap principle defined as in (A.) above to the conclusion (X.), runs as follows: (I take this to be the Fregean hidden lemma: different intensions associated with t 1 before and after a revolution may still track the same class of objects, provided that an inclusive species-to-genus overlapping of the old extension with the new extension is in place) (3.) Let C 1 and C 1 * be the classes of objects picked out by k 1 and k 1 * , before and after a revolution respectively; and let C 1 and C 1 * be non-overlapping (i.e. they do not encompass exactly the same objects and no inclusive species-to-genus overlapping is in place).
(4.) By (A.i.), (2.) and (3.), it follows that the kind k 1 is not a sub-kind k 1 * of a new kind k 2 in L 2 (5.) By (A.), (A.i.) and (4.), it follows that the term t 1 is not a sub-kind-term t 1 * in
Think of the class of objects captured by the kind term 'planet' before and after Copernicus; or, the class of objects captured by the kind term 'free fall' before and after Galileo as soon as free fall ceased to be regarded as a force-free motion and became an instantiation of Newton's second law.
(X.) For any kind k 1 and non-overlapping classes of objects C 1 and C 1 * , if k 1 picks out C 1 then some other kind k 1 * (i.e., not a sub-kind of k 1 ) must pick out C 1 * .
During a scientific revolution, the old kind concepts and the nomic generalizations associated with kind terms change, ensuing into non-overlapping (i.e. non species-togenus) classes of objects. I want to draw attention to the peculiar way in which Kuhn seemed to be using the Fregean hidden lemma (2.) in reaching conclusion (X. Second, we should ask whether the Fregean view at work in Kuhn's 'working in a new world' claim (X.) licenses any ontic mind-dependence of constructivist flavour. Namely, whether it is possible to derive from Kuhn's semantic conclusion (X.) the constructivist conclusion that scientists before and after a revolution literally work in a different world, populated by different natural kinds. I think the answer is negative. All that (X.) shows, as a semantic thesis, is that if C 1 and C 1 * are non-overlapping classes of objects, and k 1 picks out C 1 , then k 1 must be different from k 1 * (i.e. k 1 * cannot be a subkind of k 1 ). In other words, given the no-overlap principle (premise A.) and given nonoverlapping classes of objects (premise 3.), assuming a Fregean view of how kind terms fix their reference, Kuhn seems to conclude that different <kind concepts> k 1 and k 1 * must pick out non-overlapping classes of objects.
Does this claim amount to a form of fact-constructivism? I think the answer is no.
After all, recall that k 1 and k 1 * featuring in premise (A. 
Conclusion
To conclude, in this paper I have endeavoured to show three main points. First, pace
Kuhn the philosopher, even a cursory look at the history of the free fall shows that what made it possible for Galileo to see the falling stone as uniformly accelerated was precisely an influential Medieval tradition of mechanical studies, ranging from Oresme's latitude of forms to the Merton School introduction of the mean speed theorem. Hence, there is significant historical continuity between the way in which the Aristotelian-Medieval tradition saw the falling stone and the way in which Galileo saw it.
Second, that Kuhn's view (both in Structure and even more so in later writings) is better understood as subscribing to a form of semantic mind-dependence, captured by the no-overlap principle and its role for the untranslatability of scientific lexicons. And finally, that semantic mind-dependence does not open the door to any controversial ontic mind-dependence, pace any temptation to read Kuhn along constructivist lines.
